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ABSTRACT
Video feeds are often deliberately used as evidence, as in the case of
CCTV footage; but more often than not, the existence of footage of a
supposed event is perceived as proof of fact in the eyes of the public
at large. This reliance represents a societal vulnerability given the
existence of easy-to-use editing tools and means to fabricate entire
video feeds using machine learning. And, as the recent barrage
of fake news and fake porn videos have shown, this isn’t merely
an academic concern, it is actively been exploited. I posit that this
exploitation is only going to get more insidious. In this position
paper, I introduce a long term project that aims to mitigate some
of the most egregious forms of manipulation by embedding trust-
worthy components in the video transmission chain. Unlike earlier
works, I am not aiming to do tamper detection or other forms of
forensics – approaches I think are bound to fail in the face of the
reality of necessary editing and compression – instead, the aim here
is to provide a way for the video publisher to prove the integrity
of the video feed as well as make explicit any edits they may have
performed. To do this, I present a novel data structure, a video-edit
specification language and supporting infrastructure that provides
end-to-end video provenance, from the camera sensor to the viewer.
I have implemented a prototype of this system and am in talks with
journalists and video editors to discuss the best ways forward with
introducing this idea to the mainstream.
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1 INTRODUCTION
That fake news is a tricky problem to solve, is probably not news
to anyone at this point. However, it is my belief that this problem
stands to get a lot trickier once the fakesters open their eyes to
the potential of a mostly untapped weapon: trust in videos. Fake
news so far has relied on social media segregation and textual
misinformation with the odd photoshopped picture thrown here
and there. This has meant that, by and large, an intellectually honest
curious individual has been able to discover the truth behind the
fakeness. This could soon change. You see, “pics or it didn’t happen”
isn’t just a meme, it is the mental model by which people judge the
veracity of a piece of information on the Internet. What happens
when the fakesters are able to create forgeries that even a keen eye
cannot distinguish? How does a curious person distinguish truth
from fact?
We are far closer to this future than many realize: in 2017, re-
searchers created a tool that produced realistic looking video clips
of Barack Obama saying things he has never been recorded say-
ing [31]. Since then, a barrage of similar tools have become available;
an equally worrying, if slightly tangential, trend is the rise of fake
pornographic video that superimpose images of celebrities on to
adult videos. These tools represent the latest weapons in the arsenal
of fake news creators – ones far easier to use for the layman than
those before. While the videos produced by these tools may not
presently stand up to scrutiny by forensics experts, they are already
good enough to fool a casual viewer (and getting better). The end
result is that creating a good-enough fake video is now a trivial
matter.
There are, of course, more traditional ways of creating fake
videos as well. The white house itself was caught using the oldest
trick in the book while trying to justify the barring of a reporter
from the briefing room: they sped up the video to make it look
like the reporter was physically rough with a staff member [29].
Other traditional ways are misleadingly editing videos to leave out
critical context [34], or splicing video clips to map wrong answers
to questions, etc. I expect that we will see a strong increase in
these traditional fake videos before we see a further transition to
the complete fabrications discussed above. Both represent a grave
danger to the spread of truth.
The consequences of fake news have been grave in western
countries, but their effects have undoubtedly been far deadlier in
less technologically literate areas of the world. Fake news spread
via whatsapp has led to countless murders and riots in the last
couple of years in India [3]. This menace too, stands to worsen
with the use of these video editing tools. What is required is a
system that allows for users to gauge the trustworthiness of a video
and displays this in an easy-to-understand manner. Of course, the
scale of the problem and the heterogeneity of capturing devices and
underlying technologies means that no one-size-fits-all solution is
going to be feasible; yet, that is no reason to try and find at least a
one-size-fits-some solution to begin with.
In this paper, I present FrameProv, a system for establishing end to
end video provenance. Ensuring provenance represents a paradigm
shift in the fight against fake news since it aims to allow “ownership”
of videos and edits rather than the arms race of detecting malicious
edits. At the core of FrameProv, is a novel yet intuitive data structure,
the FrameChain, which ensures integrity of videos at the individual
frame level. Other major components required to make the entire
system work are a video edits specification language, a (very) small
trusted execution environment and a PKI model. I believe that
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
09
19
9v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
9 M
ay
 20
20
Figure 1: Did Obama say that or Putin? Deep fake videos such as this (where researchers produced an Obama speech he never
said) are right around the corner. We are ill-prepared to deal with this form of supercharged fake news; FrameProv offers a
way to mitigate these, and other, kinds of forgeries.
FrameProv represents a first step towards a much-needed system
of enabling trust in video streams.
While there have been several proposals for detecting forg-
eries [22, 32, 35] as well as for embedding a trusted signal in the
video feed [16, 26], we haven’t seen widespread adoption of any
of these techniques. One of the reasons for this is the need for
(legitimate) edits in video processing pipelines. Forgery detection
and integrity mechanisms fail here because of the preponderance
of false-positives – they cannot discern the intent behind the ed-
its. FrameProv takes a different route: we start off with a simple,
non-robust integrity measure on the raw video feed. Then, instead
of trying to detect tampering of this feed, we allow the publisher
to transparently edit the video before publishing it. The edit in-
formation is then conveyed to the viewer who can then make a
judgement call about whether the edits were justified or not. If the
publisher tries to surreptitiously do any edits and not declare them,
their video would fail the integrity test imposed by FrameProv.
This is a paradigm shift in how we try to authenticate and assign
trustworthiness to videos.
As we will see in Section 3, FrameProv is inherently different
from most systems that preceded it not necessarily in the technol-
ogy but in the aim of the technology. The name of the game used
to be integrity, here it is provenance, of everything including edits.
Many of the design decisions I’ve made in designing this, however,
have subtle knock-on societal effects at scale which make an open
discussion about the system extremely pertinent (and interesting).
2 WHY PROVENANCE?
The core of the problem with video integrity is that edits are
inevitable – no one wants to watch an empty podium between
speeches, there are very good reasons for wanting to have captions,
annotations, etc. The reality of video publishing is that videos will
go through multiple rounds of edits and compression. This is not a
new problem; in countless other domains we recognise the need for
edits and the accompanying necessity for establishing provenance
for those edits.
One domain that most computer scientists will be most famil-
iar with is code edits. Version control systems not only help with
coordination on large code bases but also allow retrospective re-
views of edits and the rationale and actors behind them. Another
domain where provenance plays a crucial role is the legal system.
In common law countries, precedents established in past cases help
settle present disputes. More generally, old laws can be changed by
the use of amendments which are, in essence, edits to the original
text. In the EU, these amendments are tracked by noting down the
date, rationale and presiding bodies behind the amendment (see [1]
for an example). Some countries go even further: in Australia, the
Federal Register of Legislation records not only the amendments
but also all the evidence and testimonies that went into making the
amendment in order to record the entire lifecycle of laws [4].
These systems are an affirmation of the necessity of edits to
“source” data and the consequent need to be able to trust those edits
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down the line. FrameProv aims to introduce the same paradigm to
videos.
3 RELATEDWORK
As mentioned earlier, most of the related work in this field has been
directed at detecting video forgeries. In this section, we will briefly
go over the categories of these techniques and elaborate on how
they differ from FrameProv.
3.1 Video Forensics
By far the most amount of related literature exists in the field of
video forensics. These forensics fall under three broad categories:
compression artefacts detection, scene processing and source de-
tection.
Compression artifacts have been widely studied [24]. These seek
exploit algorithm-specific artifacts to estimate the number and
kinds of edits performed to a particular video. Most compression
algorithms work on a block-by-block (where each block is an n x n
set of pixels) basis, this is why many researchers have looked into
these blocks as possible evidence for detecting recompression. Ear-
lier models used to rely on comparing the statistical differences in
pixels within the same block versus across block boundaries [15, 36].
However, due to the introduction of deblocking filters (which try to
smooth out compression artifacts) in modern video coding architec-
tures, these methods have been rendered less effective and research
is underway to improve upon their accuracy. Another vector that
has been explored is detecting double quantization – differences in
noise levels in the image due to the use of multiple compression
algorithms on select sections of the image. This method was first
used to detect recompression artifacts in MPEG streams [33]; this
was then further developed to detect the codecs used in the first
compression stage [10]. However, despite the extensive research,
double encryption detection remains a difficult problem because of
the vast diversity of video coding architectures and all the possible
combinations possible therein.
I have used “scene processing” as a catch-all phrase for tech-
niques that infer semantics from the content of the video clips
in order to detect tampering. These include things like detecting
geometric irregularities in the scenes, hue estimation, shadow de-
tection, etc. Here, I will highlight a sampling of interesting ideas.
Perhaps the most generalisable idea is that of geometric irregu-
larities – this category includes ideas like detecting irregularities
in illumination [18], misaligned perspectives on object placed in
different locations in the video [13] and irregular trajectories of fly-
ing objects [14]. Another interesting idea is that of blur estimation:
since many forgeries rely on blurring tampered regions or frames,
the researchers devised a way for detecting artificially introduced
blur regions [27].
The last field of video forensics I would like to discuss is that of
source or camera identification. The field was kick-started in [23]
where the researchers sought to identify individual camcorders
using unique patterns on a camera’s CCD chip. Since then there
have been several follow-ups to this original idea, with recent works
expanding to fingerprinting using aberrations in camera lenses [12]
as well as a camera’s colour filter array [9].
As stated earlier, the goal of forensics and FrameProv are quite
different – the goal of FrameProv is not to detect whether there has
been an edit or not but rather what edit has been performed and
whether it has been declared to the viewer.
3.2 Integrity Measures
There has been extensive research intowatermarking techniques [8]
and some of the ideas developed in that field have applications in
forgery prevention/detection, however, overall I consider it to be a
tangential strain of research.
In my review of the literature, I have found the most relevant re-
search to FrameProv in patent filings rather than in academic papers.
One of the earliest patents for integrity measures was [28]. Here,
the authors introduced a rudimentary system for DRM enforcement.
This involved a central signing authority validating all the content
by signing hashes of videos. [21] refined this idea specifically for
video streaming; here, the authors introduced authentication frames
interjected between snippets of streamed content that validated the
preceding snippet. This is very similar to what FrameChain does
albeit not at the same level of granularity.
The piece of work closest to FrameProv in this domain is [2].
Here, the system injects “integrity measures” within the video feed
itself (just like in FrameChain); if the adversary tampers the video
feed then the integrity measure will fail. Unfortunately, this is a
Chinese patent and I have been unable to locate a good translation
for this thus limiting my understanding of the system. Due to
this limitation, it is also difficult for me to pinpoint the technical
differences between their integrity measure and FrameChain. In
any case, like all the measures mentioned in this subsection, this
system too does not try to nuance the difference between legitimate
and illegitimate edits.
3.3 Related Image-based Techniques
A tangentially related piece of work is [20]. In this paper, the authors
tackled the problem of retouching in fashionmagazines. To quantify
the extent of the retouching they came up with a metric that aligned
closelywith subjective opinions.While this project isn’t tackling the
same problem, the similarity it shares with FrameProv is that they
are both trying to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate
edits rather than just a black-or-white edited/non-edited statement.
4 A PROVENANCE-REVEALING USER
INTERFACE
The make-or-break feature of this system is the user interface. If
the users don’t feel that they can trust it, or if they can’t understand
it intuitively, then no amount of cryptography will help. Luckily,
we have some assistance in this department. There are several evils
that ubiquitous communication has brought with it, but there is
one good that has accompanied it which we can utilize here: users
now have very good mental models of what video streaming looks
like and what video annotations mean. This is a major change in
the landscape: instead of having to deal with myriad video players
(and user expectations), we now only need to target one. More-
over, YouTube has also introduced timestameped annotations to
the masses: everyone knows that the yellow lines on the YouTube
seek bar denote advertisements. What if we could leverage this
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Figure 2: YouTube has trained users to associate yellow boxes on the timeline with ads. We could use this same mechanism to
expose edits to the user. Here, we see a mock up of how blue boxes could be used to show edit locations. Hovering over the
blue boxes shows edit information. The “Verify Locally” button allows the user to download raw provenance data and validate
it locally without trusting the hosting platform.
mental model to annotate provenance data of videos in an easy-to-
understand manner?
Figure 2 shows a mock-up of one such system. I am leveraging
the user’s expectation of seeing relevant information in the seek-
bar to also serve edits information. Ads show up as yellow bars
as before, edits show up as blue bars. Hovering over the blue bar
shows the edits performed at that point. Additionally, we present a
button to the user for locally verifying the provenance of the video;
I feel that this option makes it easier to trust the interface than
an opaque “take-it-or-leave-it” checkmark. This interface is the
final user-facing product that we need to deliver regardless of the
underlying infrastructure. The remainder of the paper is dedicated
to discussing the various options available for said infrastructure.
5 INFRASTRUCTURE AND ADVERSARY
MODEL
Figure 3 shows an overview of the various steps involved in the
broadcasting of videos. There are many more intermediary compo-
nents but for the purposes of our discussion, this level of granularity
will suffice.
The first decision we need to make is to choose the “ends” of
our end-to-end system. Ideally, we would want our system to cover
the entire video transmission chain from the camera sensor to
the viewer’s screen. This minimises the security perimeter of the
system to just the camera sensor and the display. With FrameProv,
we come quite close to this ideal. I decided to embed a small trusted
execution environment in between the camera sensor and the local
camera storage. While this does introduce the need to trust some
form tamper-evident packaging, I believe that this is the closest
we can get to a true end-to-end system without designing custom
camera sensors.
On the other end of the transmission chain, I assume that the
plugin used to verify the video (whether running on the viewer’s
computer or on a hosted platform) executes the verification script
correctly. I also allow for variants that introduce a trusted editing
platforms for ease of distribution of finished videos at the cost of
trusting the platform. In addition to these two points of trust, we
also need to introduce a trusted publicly viewable key store; I’ll
elaborate on this in the next section.
Given all of this, I’ve assumed a pessimistically powerful ad-
versary model. We assume that the adversary has compromised
the entire video transmission chain except for the trust perimeter
around the sensor and the verification device. We assume that the
viewing device is not compromised and performs verification of
the feeds correctly (and gives appropriate notifications to the user).
We assume that the adversary cannot inject anything between the
camera sensor and the TEE, or tamper with the tamper-evident
packaging in any way without leaving obvious evidence of the
tampering. Lastly, standard cryptographic assumptions apply: the
adversary cannot find collisions for hashes, cannot forge signatures,
etc.
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Figure 3: High level overview of a typical video transmission chain
Figure 4: The Framechain data structure
6 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this section I’ll give a high level overview of FrameProv. First, I’ll
list the system requirements; then, I’ll introduce the data structures
I’ve used to carry the provenance information and lastly we’ll look
at the infrastructure and the various design choices therein.
6.1 System requirements
FrameProv must fulfil the following requirements
• The ability to associate video feeds with specific camera
sensors
• The ability to validate the integrity of a raw video feed
• Support for signed edits that can later be exposed to the
users
• An easy-to-understand, intuitive user interface
6.2 Data structures
There are two main data structures necessary for the functioning of
FrameProv: FrameChain and the Video Edit Specification Language
(VESL). Let’s now look at each in turn.
6.2.1 Framechain Data Structure. The framechain data structure is
effectively a blockchain where the blocks are RGB 2D-arrays and
the hashes are represented as a subset of the first row of RGB pixels.
Figure 4 illustrates this idea. More specifically, a framechain file is
a set of n 2D arrays where the first array encodes metadata about
the camera sensor and the Tiny TEE (which we’ll see in the next
section). Arrays 2 to n− 1 are raw RGB video frames where the first
row of pixels encodes the hash of the last array. Array n encodes a
signature over the hash of array n − 1 and, optionally, a set of other
preceding arrays.
One might question the need for the framechain data structure.
Why not simply hash the entire video file after it is recorded and
sign that? The reasons for not going through with this simpler
approach (and other similar strawmen approaches), briefly, are as
follows:
• Streaming. One of the advantages of the framechain ap-
proach is that it is possible to stream an authenticated video
stream without knowing what the final hash would be.
• Single data stream.The framechain stream is self-contained.
No external stream of data is required to authenticate the
video feed. This simplifies the constraints on the supporting
infrastructure as it is now possible to use any existing video
streaming platform.
• Visual indicators and ease of verification. The rapidly
varying row of pixels at the top of the video serve as a visual
aid to the viewer, indicating that the video they are watching
may use FrameChain provenance technology irrespective of
the video player they may use to view it. This also makes
designing verification plugins for existing video players an
easier task since we are not dependent on container-specific
metadata for the authentication stream; it is simply a matter
of reading the values of a specific set of pixels.
• Snippet signing.With FrameChain, it is possible to affirm
the integrity of sections of the video feed; this could help
with the editing process by reducing the number of declared
edits during relatively unedited sections of the video.
Verification of the framechain data structure (with no edits) is a
simple matter of iterating over the feed from the first array to the
last, verifying the hashes at each step along the way before finally
verifying the signature encoded in the last frame. If multiple frames
were signed in the last frame, then the verifier informs the user of
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the additionally verified snippets so that they can be used instead
of the entire video feed.
6.2.2 Video Edit Specification Language (VESL). The VESL is a
JSON-like markup language that encodes edits to a framechain file.
The VESL encoded edits are what allow the publisher to make their
edits known to the viewer. That said, the particulars of the language
aren’t too crucial for the architecture of the system – as long as the
verification script can parse it, any language can be used to specify
the edits. Every VESL file must be accompanied by a signature over
it; this allows an editor to assert ownership over the edits.
As it stands, VESL only supports reductions, not additions. That
is, we have ways to specify compression, frame drops, changes in
playback speed, etc. However, we do not yet support operations
such as overlaying text or adding external graphics: operations
that require interfacing with additional sources of graphics. I ac-
knowledge that these are crucial operations with legitimate uses;
figuring out how to support these operations within VESL remains
one of the major challenges with FrameProv. Listing 1 shows a
simple VESL example that illustrates frame deletion, applying pre-
set colour filters before applying compression to the entire file. To
reduce verbosity of the VESL file, defaults from the widely used
video editing software, FFmpeg [5], are used wherever they are
unspecified within VESL.
1 {
2 "editType" : "rangeDeletion",
3 "rangeDeletionParams" : {
4 "fromFrame" : "1250" ,
5 "toFrame" : "1500"
6 },
7 "editType" : "videoFilter",
8 "videoFilterParams" : [
9 {
10 "filterType" : "alpha",
11 "fromFrame" : "2010" ,
12 "toFrame" : "2020" ,
13 "typeParams" : {}
14 },
15 {
16 "filterType" : "atadenoise",
17 "fromFrame" : "2040" ,
18 "toFrame" : "2090" ,
19 "typeParams" : {
20 "0b" : "1.6"
21 }
22 }
23 ],
24 "editType" : "compression",
25 "compressionParams" : {
26 "algorithm" : "H.264"
27 "algorithmParams" : {
28 "CRF" : "27",
29 "preset" : "veryfast",
30 "twopass" : "true"
31 }
32 }
33 }
Listing 1: VESL example
6.3 Delivery Modes
One of the shortcomings of the FrameProv system as described
above is that it operates on raw RGB arrays and it can only affirm
the veracity of these arrays. Any kind of compression or editing
would render the hashes invalid and would thus fail. This is an issue
since for many applications where compression, at the very least,
is necessary. To enable these operations, as illustrated in Figure 5, I
envision three different delivery modes for framechain feeds.
6.3.1 Direct stream. The simplest delivery mode for FrameProv is
direct streaming. The viewer downloads the raw framechain data
and renders it locally on her machine. This allows for immediate
validation of the video feed without introducing any additional
trusted components. The drawback of this approach is the immense
bandwidth requirement of downloading uncompressed frame data
and the lack of any ability to do edits.
6.3.2 Trusted editing platform. Here we introduce a trusted actor,
namely, a trusted editing platform to both give the means to edit the
video as well as to host it for viewing. When an uploader uploads
the raw framechain, the platform first verifies it and only allows the
uploader to proceed if the verification succeeds. Next, it allows the
uploader to compress the video and to do edits. The set of allowed
edits is currently limited but I am looking into ways to expand this
to support arbitrary edits. Then, the uploader can open the video to
public viewing. Figure 2 shows what the end result of this process
would look like.
While this approach introduces a trusted intermediary, I believe
that this is the most promising approach given the low bandwidth
requirements on the servers as well as the end users.
6.3.3 Delayed verification. Conceptually this is quite similar to the
trusted editing platform except that instead of trusting the editing
platform, the verification is done by the user on their local machine.
The flow in this case looks like this:
(1) Viewer downloads compressed and possibly edited video.
(2) After viewing the video, viewer decides to verify its in-
tegrity. She requests the source framechain data and the
VESL-encoded edits. Each edit must be accompanied by a
valid signature (this identifies the editor).
(3) Viewer creates a local copy of the video by performing the
VESL-encoded edits on the framechain data.
(4) Viewer hashes the computed video and the downloaded
video and compares the hashes. If the hashes match, verifi-
cation has succeeded.
6.3.4 Hybrid approach. Delayed verification can also be used as
a means to mitigate the trust issues of the previous approach: the
trusted editing and hosting platform can provide users with the
option to download the framechain and VESL files to perform local
validation. This hybrid verification approach allows users on con-
strained devices (in terms of bandwidth or computational power) to
view edited videos while allowing unconstrained viewers to verify
the devices locally and keep the platform honest.
6.4 Tiny TEE
Tiny TEE is a (very) small trusted component that only has one
function: create a framechain from the raw sensor outputs. To
do this, it needs to be able to perform three operations: hashing,
signatures and initial frame generation. The sequence of operations
are as follows:
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Figure 5: Overview of FrameProv highlighting the three different possible delivery modes. Components in red are trusted.
(1) User presses “record” on the camera package.
(2) Tiny TEE generates a new initial frame encoding camera
information, TEE hardware-based public key and other meta-
data (timestamp, sequence number, etc.)
(3) The sensor is activated and starts recording. The first frame
from the sensor is sent to the Tiny TEE.
(4) Tiny TEE hashes the initial frame, encodes it as a row of
pixels and embeds it onto the first sensor frame.
(5) This operation is repeated until the user presses the stop
recording button.
(6) Upon receiving the stop signal, the sensor stops recording.
Tiny TEE signs the hash of the last frame appended by video
metadata (number of frames, framerate, etc.). This signed
data and the signature are encoded as an RGB frame and
sent to storage.
Tiny TEE is co-located with the sensor in a tamper-evident package.
Thus, if an adversary tries to inject fake feeds into the TEE, they
would first have to destroy the packaging. Any later investigation
would see this tampering and cast doubt over the footage.
One might wonder why I chose to go with tamper-evidence
rather than tamper-resistance. This is because tamper resistance
cannot be guaranteed. Getting into the device is simply a function
of investment. To be certain of the veracity of the video feed, we
would have to inspect the package anyway. Tamper-resistance does
not afford us any additional security guarantees beyond (possibly)
increasing the investment required by the adversary for an attack.
6.5 FrameProv PKI
Implicit in the discussion about Tiny TEE has been a PKI: we need
something to supply the TEE with a hardware-based private key
that is used to sign the FrameChain. This PKI requirement has been
the weakness of every TEE mechanism proposed so far, and for
good reason – the entity managing the PKI potentially has the
power to make arbitrary assertions about the existence of the TEEs
and the operations performed by them. PKIs for TEEs are tricky,
there’s no getting around that fact.
However, I do believe that there are properties about our sce-
nario that make it possible to come up with an acceptable solution.
For one, device privacy is not a requirement. In fact, exposing the
identity of the responsible TEE is a requisite feature not a bug.
Existing TEE systems such as Intel SGX have had to use privacy
preserving ID schemes [17] because of their need to hide the TEE
identity. This leads to a situation where Intel could do sybil attacks
by creating phantom TEEs. When we give up on the privacy re-
quirement, we take away the problem to a large extent. Now, we
can simply publish all the public keys generated by our PKI along
with their genesis timestamps and even which organisation owns
a particular TEE. This severely reduces the scope of possible sybil
attacks that a malicious PKI can commit.
Another factor that helps us is the fact that our TEE is not a
general purpose TEE. In fact, since it only ever interfaces with one
component and only ever does one set of operations, it is possible
to have a completely non-reprogrammable TEE. This reduction
in scope allows us to do away with difficult primitives such as
remote attestation. Simply verifying the signature is sufficient for
validating the output of Tiny TEE.
Of course, despite these reductions in scope, the PKI still is a
point of failure.We still need to trust it to delete the private key once
it has been injected into the TEE. If it doesn’t do so then it can create
arbitrary FrameChain masquerading as having originated from that
TEE. This is a trust issue that is hard to mitigate, despite some
promising recent industrial solutions [30]. Another interesting PKI
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question is how to assign identities to the edits that are declared
within VESL; do we use a simple git-like sign-off declaration or try
to establish a PKI? The answer to this is inherently tied to how we
expect the videos to be published.
7 DEPLOYMENT SCENARIOS
At present, I have implemented a prototype of FrameProv using
a Sony IMX219 sensor and a raspberry pi simulating Tiny TEE.
I have also implemented verification scripts that can be run on
local FrameChain data (Python) as well as a Firefox plugin that can
operate on remotely hosted data. This gives some confidence that
such a solution is at least technically feasible. The difficult question
then is how do we bring this system to the real world? How do we
deploy FrameProv in a sensible manner that allows for scale while
still maintaining public perception of trust in the system?
I do not envision FrameProv being available on commodity hard-
ware to begin with. I think that the best way to deploy such a system
in the field would be by first issuing it to trusted news networks
and integrating the verification plugin into major video hosting
websites (with the option to do local verification, as mentioned in
section 6.3.4). I have had informal talks with two video platforms
and there does seem to be a real interest in such a system. From
their perspective, having an independent third party develop such
a system reduces the amount of trust that needs to be placed in the
video platforms.
As a stop-gap solution, it is also possible to do the verification via
a browser plugin. As mentioned above, I have created a prototype
verification plugin which reads the descriptions of hosted videos for
links to raw framechain and VESL data, loads it and then verifies the
veracity of the displayed video. While this approach introduces the
additional friction for users of installing a plugin, and for uploaders
to host the raw feed data, it allows us to deploy FrameProv today
without waiting for integration with major hosting platforms. This
is an easy way for us to expand this proof-of-concept to the open
Internet and refine the system before major integrations with video
platforms.
8 SHOULDWE DO THIS?
An interesting topic of discussion would be to ask ourselves: let’s
say we can actually deploy a large scale institutionally supported
version of FrameProv, then should we? So far, we have listed the
pros of having a FrameProv system to society, but there are genuine
concerns as well. In this section, we discuss these concerns and
point at possible mitigation for each, if any.
8.1 Citizen Journalism
One way that FrameProv may end up doing more harm than good
if it were to be publicly adopted is in the public perception of non-
FrameProv videos, namely, that it may debase public trust in them.
If we assume that FrameProv’s Tiny TEE isn’t widely incorporated
into mobile phones1 but primarily in dedicated cameras held by
1While there isn’t any fundamental technical difference between camera sensors in
phones and standalone cameras as far as difficulty of integration is concerned, there
are organizational difficulties with the former. Phone companies tend to maintain a
tight systems integration and convincing them to incorporate a new TEE onto the
SoC would be challenging. A possible solution is to use existing TEEs available in
phones [6, 7] instead of Tiny TEE.
news organizations, this would lead to a situation where there is
effectively a new trust tier that is only accessible to news organiza-
tions.
Citizen journalism has seen a promising rise in recent years,
driven by the ubiquity of phone cameras; what happens when
those cameras are seen as fallible witnesses rather than evidence?
Is the death of citizen journalism the price we have to pay in order
to make society view videos with higher scepticism? There is an
argument to be made that perceiving video footage as equivalent to
witness testimony is overall a positive thing as it gets at the heart of
the fake news problem; however, this shift would also do away with
all the good brought about by a “sousveillance” world [11]. This
is therefore a decision that needs to be made with open eyes and
after careful deliberation, not sleep-walked into. Indeed, the ideal
situation from a citizen journalism point of view would be where
FrameProv is ubiquitously deployed. This, however, may lead to
other concerns as we shall discuss in the following subsections.
8.2 PKI Concerns
Another reason why FrameProv might not be such a good idea is
because it potentially places the keys to trust on the Internet in the
hands of the maintainer of the FrameProv PKI. I have discussed the
technical reasons for why this doesn’t necessarily have to be a deal-
breaker in Section 6.5 but it still leaves open the question of who
operates the PKI and TEE manufacturing facility. The answer to
this is a function of economics, politics and public perception more
than technical expertise. FrameProv is a system for the benefit of a
fixed set of news organizations, and theoretically, as long as these
organizations can agree upon a custodian for the PKI (along with
the necessary oversight) most of the issues of centralization can be
abstracted away. However, the real world of alliances is messy and
public opinion on such matters can be a fickle thing. This raises
interesting questions about public-facing custodian schemes that
we haven’t quite had to face at scale yet.
Similar concerns apply, albeit to a less severe extent, to the signa-
tures accompanying VESL-encoded edits. These signatures would
ideally be mapped to the video editors in order for the viewer
to have an insight into the entire provenance chain of a video.
However, this makes it very important to be able to trust the PKI
infrastructure since editors would be staking their reputations on
it.
8.3 Privacy Concerns
Privacy concerns arise in three ways: preserving the privacy of
subjects in the video, preserving the privacy of the video recorder
and preserving the privacy of the video editors. The first of these
requires us to re-think the verification process. Let’s reason about
this with an example. Let’s say we are using FrameProv to record a
whistleblower’s testimony which includes her appearing in front of
the camera. In this situation, we want to be able to assert that we
have made no tweaks to the recording but we also want to preserve
the whistleblower’s anonymity. This, necessarily, means that we
cannot release the raw FrameChain data to public at large. The next
best thing we can do, and how journalists actually tend to work,
is to escrow the trust. So, instead of releasing the raw files to all
viewers, we get in trusted third parties to view the raw files and
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validate the FrameChain. Once they do that, they can then assert
that the edited video (with, say, black bars over the whistleblower’s
face) is not misleading. Then, we can use this asserted video as the
new root of trust and make it available for public viewing. Such a
trusted third party arrangement may prove to be necessary for a
number of sensitive videos.
Preserving the privacy of the video recorder entails a trade-off:
being able to pinpoint the recording device allows us to verify the
integrity of the TEE but exposes the identity of the recorder (or the
owner of the device). This can be made less severe by using privacy
preserving group signature schemes, as mentioned in Section 6.5,
and making TEE verification voluntary. Thus, the recorder of the
video gets to choose whether or not to reveal their identity. Pre-
serving the privacy of the video editors is even simpler: the editors
can simply use ephemeral keys and throw them away after signing
the VESL files without putting them on any look up infrastructure.
In this way, the keys end up serving as ephemeral pseudonyms. Of
course, this would mean that the viewer will see edits being made
by an unidentified editor which may affect their trust perceptions
of the video.
9 FUTUREWORK
While FrameProv is still in the very early stages of development,
it is quite clear already that any such system requires extensive
related research to determine the consequences of their deployment.
Here, I list a few such pieces of future work.
9.1 Sensible defaults for edit warnings
Experience has shown that warnings are only effective when they
are seen as useful. This means that we need to be selective in which
edits we show most prominently to the end user; the decision of
which those should be is not immediately obvious to us. Clearly,
cutting out of frames should be remarked upon but the use of
compression can probably be conveyed more subtly. We do not
want to overwhelm the user with warnings nor do we want them
to miss out on a critical edit – this tradeoff represents a challenging,
and interesting, HCI problem.
9.2 Anchoring to blockchains
There are several ways in which we can utilize public blockchains
to further increase the integrity guarantees of FrameProv. The most
intuitive would be to time constrain the video: if the recording
device has access to the state of, say, the Bitcoin blockchain [25], it
can retrieve the latest mined block. If the device does this before
recording the video and encodes the hash of the block in the first
frame then we can prove that the video must have been recorded
after that block was mined. One may choose to use non-forking
blockchains to get tighter timing constraints on this assurance.
After the video has been recorded, the recorder can also hash the
FrameChain and anchor that hash on to a public blockchain by
sending it as a transaction payload. This helps us prove that the
video must have been recorded before that block was mined. Thus,
in combination, these two anchors give us a time frame for when
the recording took place. This gives us another datapoint to increase
our trust in the video. If all editors do this anchoring then we can
have a trusted timestamp to go with the entire video provenance
chain making tampering even more difficult.
Another way in which we can leverage public blockchains is by
the look up details of the editors on the blockchain. While this in-
troduces concerns around revocation and data regulations, it would
help allay fears of foul-play by any centralized look-up service.
9.3 Re-recording detection
One attack that could be launched on FrameProv is the following:
attacker records a video, maliciously edits it and then plays it back
on a screen. Then the attacker records the edited video with a
FrameProv device. Such a video would pass the verification process.
There has been research into detecting such replays in the context
of copyright protection [19], however, this needs to be expanded
and included into the verification script itself.
9.4 Edit-heavy videos
The discussion surrounding the usability and delivery of the Frame-
Prov system has so far made an implicit assumption about the kinds
of videos we are interested. The system proposed as is works best
for short videos with minor edits and single source file. However,
that covers a small (if important) subset of videos in general. Many
videos usemultiple source files spliced together – this would require
us to come up with a way to meaningfully show the provenance of
multiple files in a final video. It is also not uncommon for editors to
throw away the vast majority of the recorded content in the final
video – this would force us to reconsider how we display edits;
perhaps in this case it makes more sense to show what has been
retained rather than what has been pruned. This last use case also
raises questions about storage and bandwidth requirements: raw
video files are massive, and if we need to store many times the
length of the final video then is it even feasible to do verification?
Such concerns give another reason for us to further develop the
escrowed trust models presented in Section 8.3.
10 CONCLUSION
Videos are the next frontier for the fakesters to exploit due to the
emergence of new fabrication techniques. Existing literature has
focused on detecting forgeries or on identifying the source cameras
in order to do forensics. These tools, however, are woefully inade-
quate due to the necessity of legitimate edits as well as the mass
distribution of videos on modern video platforms that make custom
forensics infeasible. In this paper, I have presented an alternative
paradigm – instead of trying to detect or prevent changes to the
source video, we should allow the editors to declare all of their
edits to the viewer. In order to enable this paradigm, we introduced
FrameProv, a prototype system that creates signed source files that
can be edited in a verifiable way by the end viewer. I believe that
this idea of allowing declared edits while disallowing surreptitious
ones is the way forward in dealing with deepfake and fraudulent
videos.
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